Fairfield University

DigitalCommons@Fairfield
Sociology & Anthropology Faculty Publications

Sociology & Anthropology Department

Winter 2004

Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State
Paul Silverstein
David Crawford
Fairfield University, dcrawford@fairfield.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/sociologyandanthropologyfacultypubs

Copyright 2004 Middle East Report
Peer Reviewed
Repository Citation
Silverstein, Paul and Crawford, David, "Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State" (2004). Sociology &
Anthropology Faculty Publications. 9.
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/sociologyandanthropology-facultypubs/9

Published Citation
Crawford, David L. and Silverstein, Paul. (2004). "Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State" in The Middle East
Report, issue 233. Ed. Chris Toensing. Pp. 44-48. Washington, D.C.: MERIP 2004.
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rightsholder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu.

REPORT
SPECIAL

Amazigh Activism an
Paul

Silverstein

and

David

the

State

Crawford

hen primary school students in the major Berberspeaking regions of Morocco returned to class in
September2004, for the first time ever they were requiredto study Berber(Tamazight)language.The mandatory
languageclassesin the Rif, the Middle Atlas, the High Atlas
and the SousValleyrepresentthe firstsignificantpolicy change
implemented by the Royal Institute of the Amazigh [Berber]
Culture,a governmentbody establishedby King Mohammed
VI on October 17, o00I, followingthroughon a promisemade
in July of that yearon the second anniversaryof his ascension
to the Moroccan throne.
This royal edict, or dahir, representsa dramatic reversal
of legal discrimination against Imazighen (Berbers)and an
explicit attempt to reclaimBerbernessas "aprincipalelement
of national culture, as a cultural heritage present across all
stagesof Moroccanhistory and civilization."Since Moroccan
nationalist discourse has tended to emphasize links to the
high culture of Arab-Islamiccivilization, and in particular
the royal patriline leading back to the Prophet Muhammad,
the dahirindicatesa shift in, or at least an amendment to, the
official national imaginary.Instead of posing Berberculture
as a challenge to national unity, the king promoted embracing it as a necessarystep in his project for a "democraticand
modernist society."
The dahir and subsequentestablishmentof the Royal Institute, known in Morocco by its Frenchname, l'Institut Royal
de la Culture Amazighe, or IRCAM, are partly the result of
domestic and international pressureto create a transparent
regime of social justice and human rights. These initiatives
met many of the demands made over the last 20 years by
the various cultural associations, student groups and political movements associatedwith the diffuseAmazigh Cultural
Movement (MCA), and increasingly,the United States and
other allieshaveheraldedMorocco'sreformeffortsas a success
story. The shifts in the national imaginaryalso signal a creative responseof the Moroccanstate to transnationalIslamist
politics, a response that weds the rhetoric of ethno-national
identity to a universalistdiscourse of democracy.The dahir
thus serves to transformAmazigh militants into allies of the
state in Morocco'slocal "waron terror."
Nonetheless, the creationof IRCAM and its interventions
to promote Berber art and culture in the spheres of media
and education have neithergone unopposed within the ranks
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of Amazigh activists, nor been recognizedas anything other
than distant state "politics"by the mass of Berbers in the
countryside.Activistshave challengedevery decision leading
up to curricularreform, as they suspect that the institute is
simply a state attempt to coopt the Amazigh opposition and
turn living Berberculture into static folklore. In spite of the
dahir, Amazigh militants have been detained repeatedlyby
police and threatenedwith chargesof treasonfor taking part
in streetdemonstrationsfor Berberland rightsand the naming
ofTamazightas a constitutionallyrecognizednationallanguage
of Morocco. Such a climateof perceivedrepressionis accepted
with evident apathy by most Berbers,but has ironicallyradicalized some Amazigh militants into the ideal supportersof
GeorgeW. Bush'sglobalwaron terror.Viewing the Moroccan
state as a bastion of Arab nationalism, the latter have taken
increasinglyanti-Arabpositions that go so far as to deny the
legitimacy of the Palestiniancause and support the US invasion of Iraq, positions that have led to conflict with Islamist
and Marxist opposition groups, as well as with elements of
Moroccan state security.Ratherthan assuringnational unity,
the establishment of IRCAM has arguablyexacerbatedthe
fragmentationof not only the Amazigh movement, but also
Moroccanoppositional politics in general.

andStateCooptation
Militancy
Amazigh
Berberspeakersare estimated to make up 40 percent of the
Moroccanpopulation.1In spite of the fact that Muslim Berber
dynastiescontrolledMoroccoat variouspoints since the arrival
of Islam,the conflationof Arabiclanguage,Islamiclegitimacy
and Arabethnicity has nonethelessproved to be an enduring
featureof Moroccan consciousness.Viewing Berbercultural
identity as largelya colonial invention designed to fragment
the Moroccannation, the I95osnationalistmovement-under
the direction of the IstiqlalParty,consisting primarilyof FezbasedFrancophoneelites-sought to forgea univocalidentity
for Moroccansalong the ideologicallines of an Arabnationalism imported primarilyfrom Egypt and Lebanon. Until the
IRCAM dahir,the monarchy,derivingits temporalauthority
from its religious lineage, had repeatedlyunderwrittensuch
an Arabo-Islamistideology that has entailed the adoption of
Arabicas the official and national languageof Morocco.
This version of Moroccan nationalismhas faced severeopposition, particularlyfrom the Berberophoneleft. Alreadyin
the I96os, Berberstudentsand intellectualsin Rabatand Paris,
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under the aegis of the AssociationMarocainede la Recherche
et des Echanges Culturels (AMREC), began collecting and
disseminatingBerberfolkloreand oraltraditions.In the 1970s,
these activities became more politicized, with the growth of
severalculturalassociations,the Universited'Eted'Agadirand
Tamaynunt, who actively promoted Berber identity.2 However, it was the Algerian-Kabylestudent uprisings of April
I980 (known internationallyas the Berber Spring) and the
subsequent solidification of a transnationalBerber Cultural
Movement (MCB) that galvanizedMoroccanAmazigh ethnolinguisticmilitancyinto a public movement,with conferences
and a publishedjournal,Amazigh.
While this movementwas largelyrepressedduringthe I98os,
therehas been an immense resurgencewithin the last ten years.
In 1994, seven teachers,most of whom were membersof the
Amazigh associationTilelli (Freedom)from the southeastern
oasis town of Goulmima, were arrestedafter their participation in a May Day paradein nearby Errachidiafor carrying
bannerswritten in Tifinagh. Police held the seven for several
weeks, after which the courts sentenced three of them to
prison terms and large fines. The three were later releasedon
appeal and the charges subsequently dropped after the case
receivedwidespreadinternationalpublicity and offers of aid.
Responding to the outcry, the Moroccan government promised reforms,with Prime Minister Abdellatif Fillali opening
channels for Berber-languageprogramming in the national
broadcastmedia and the late King Hassan II declaringin his
uutismeme Hoyaimsmire oIme Amazlg0
Cuture,
August 1994ThroneDay speech that Amazigh "dialects"were
"one of the components of the authenticity of our history" Riyadhand owned by the Group Ominum North Africa,the
and should in theory be taught in state schools. Since this largest Moroccan enterprise controlled by the royal
family.
speech, Amazigh associationsand newspapers(now number- The IRCAM is building its own state-of-the-artfacilitywhose
ing in double digits) have flourishedthroughout Morocco. In monumental design incorporatesa number of recognizable
a varietyof chartersand internationaldeclarations,Amazigh Amazigh motifs. The administrativeand researchcenters are
militants have promulgateda redefinitionof Morocco on the fabulouslyequippedwith the latesttechnology,and the
library
basis of its pre-colonial and pre-IslamicBerberheritage, and has actively acquired printed and audiovisual materials. Rehave sought political change to preserveBerberculture and gardlessof any actual policies put in place by IRCAM, such
languageas a "humanright."
expenditures constitute a bold public relations gambit, perTo address these demands the state created IRCAM. The forming the commitment to transparentcultural
qua human
institute's 33-member administrative council was recruited rightsdemandedby US and Europeaninterlocutorswho hold
through the Amazigh associationalstructure,with an appar- the purse strings for development aid and could recommend
ent attempt to garneran equal representationof activistsfrom admittance into the EuropeanUnion. Morocco'srecent
posithe three major Berberophoneregions in the Rif, the Middle tive dialogues with the UN and the State
Department attest
Atlas and the Sous. Amazigh militantswith technical training to the gambit'sinitial success.3
and advanced degrees have likewise been incorporatedinto
the institute'sseven researchcenters charged with linguistic
standardization,pedagogicaldevelopment,artisticexpression,
anthropologicalanalysis, historical preservation,translation The repercussionsof the establishment of IRCAM for the
and media promotion, and communication. Salariesoffered Amazigh movement and Moroccan oppositional
politics
to researchersaresuperiorto what could be earnedin the state are harderto judge. On the one hand, the institute has sucschool system or even as a teacher in the burgeoning private ceeded in bringingtogether
Amazigh militants from different
education market.
associationsand ideological factions. On the eve of the dahir,
Boasting an estimated annual budget of $ioo million, the three distinct and opposed groups could be identified: the
institute is temporarilyhoused in a hyper-modern commer- "royalist"Mouvement National Populaireand its allied associal center located in the posh Rabat neighborhood of Hayy ciations, drawingtheir majorsupport from the Middle Atlas;
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the "historical,""moderate"AMREC based in Rabat, whose
membership is essentially the urban intelligentsia; and the
"left-wing"Tamaynunt/Universited'Ete d'Agadir,which drew
its base primarilyfrom the Sous. Among militants employed
in the researchcenters, these divisions proved untenable and
soon largelybroke down.
On the other hand, the establishment of IRCAM has effectively split the movement into two macro-factions:those
who support the institute'sagenda, and those who oppose it,
either on principle or out of resentment for not having been
recruited into it. Activists who joined the institute attest to
the difficulty of the choice, of their foreknowledge that they
would lose credibility in the eyes of their peers, but in the
end they believed that they had a better chance of facilitating change by working within the system. Today they are
often denounced by some of their former comrades as having been makhzenise(or even ircamise), of literally having

been transformed into de facto representativesof the state
(al-makhzen).Opponents are outspoken in their belief that
the institute works in the interest of global forces of Arab
nationalism, publicly declaiming that "IRCAM = IRCAN"
("filth"in the Tashelhit dialect).
Dissenters point to several recent institute decisions as
evidence of IRCAM'shidden "divideand conquer" strategy
with respect to the transnational Amazigh movement. In
the first place, they object to the official adoption of the Tifinagh script as the standardmeans to write Berberlanguage
in Morocco. The 2003 decision was highly contested within
IRCAM, decided by only a handful of votes accordingto one
of the members of the administrative council, and derived
in large part from members' fears of threatened Islamist reprisalsshould the Latin script have been adopted. Although
officially couched in a language of cultural authenticity, the
adoption ofTifinagh was, in the end, a political compromise.
Nevertheless, many Amazigh militants
view the decision as a thinly veiled ploy
to separateMoroccanBerbersfrom those
in Kabyliaor diasporaFrancewhere Berber language (Tamazight) is written in
the Latinalphabet.They also understand
the production of separate textbooks
in the three major Moroccan Berber
dialects (Tarifit, Tamazight and Tashelhit), instead of the standardTamazight
e
developed by Paris-based linguists, as
part of an effort not only to divide the
ri
I
internationalBerbercommunity, but to
fragment the national one as well.
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the annual High Atlas moussemwhere young Berbermen and
women marry supposedly outside of familial negotiations.
Promoted by the Moroccan state over the last ten years as a
tourist destination, the festival had become an opportunity
for local culturalassociationsto support their yearlyactivities
by vending High Atlas Berber arts and crafts, or by being
paid by the state for their musical and dance performances.
In 2004, however, the moussemwas taken over by Aourid's
center, which promoted it as an "Amazigh"event, bringing
in performancegroups from acrossMorocco, Algeria,France
and Canada. Local associations were excluded from the
organization and enactment of the festival, a symbolic and
financial blow that has elicited much criticism.
In this sense,IRCAMand its sisterRabatorganizationshave
furtherradicalizeda number of Amazigh militants in the Moroccanhinterlandand exacerbateda long-standingurban-rural
divide. In newspapereditorials,on e-mail list-serves,through
photocopied tractsand duringperiodicpublic demonstrations,
these critics have adopted an increasinglyextremistdiscourse
in the face of what they see as a persistenceof the dominance
of an ArabizedFez elite. They bemoan the lack of Berberrepresentationin the upperechelonsof the governmentand claim
the right to createan Amazigh political party.They decry the
economic marginalizationof Berberophoneruralareasand call
for sustainedstate investmentin infrastructure.They demand
the protection of triballands from ongoing expropriationby
state agents and private speculators, identifying land, like
language, as an essentialpart of Berberidentity. Finally,they
promulgatethe recognition of Tamazightin the constitution
as a national and official languageof Morocco, and therefore
a mandatory subject in all schools, not just those attended
by mostly Berberophone students. The current linguistic
educationalsituation, they insist, will only ensure the demise
of Berberlanguage and the further marginalizationof rural
Berberophones.
The radical nature of these demands has brought these
Amazigh militants into occasional confrontation with state
authorities. On August 29, 2001, Moroccan national security

officials brought into custody two of the members of Tilelli
who had previouslybeen arrestedin I994 and informed them
that they would be rearrestedand tried for treason for any
future participation in demonstrations. In March 2004, five
other Tilelli members were similarly threatened with arrest
for taking part in an unauthorizedsit-in to protest the state's
cession of five hectares of tribal land to a private investor.
More poignantly, on April 21, 2004, during a march orga-

nized to commemorate the twenty-fourth anniversaryof the
BerberSpring, four student militants from the University of
Agadir branch of the MCA were detained, interrogatedand
severely beaten by police. In every case, association leaders used the Amazigh press and the virtual organization of
Amazigh militancy on e-mail list-serves and websites to call
rapid attention to the confrontations and elicit support. In
severalcases, militants used their ties to membersofIRCAM
MIDDLE
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and high-profile Rabat-basedhuman rights organizationsto
lift the threat of legal repercussions.

"Arabo-lslamic
Imperialism"
In addition to maintaining a state of low-intensity conflict
between the Amazigh movement and the state, peripheral
Amazigh extremism has furthered a rift within Moroccan
oppositional politics that, ironically,has benefited the state.
While the Moroccanleft-along with the vast majorityof the
Moroccan population, Arab- and Berberophonealike-has
been vehemently opposed to the US-led war on terrorand
occupation of Iraq, Amazigh militants tend to see Saddam
Hussein and Osama bin Laden as part of the same scourge
of "Arabo-Islamicimperialism"that threatens their cultural
particularity.They are proud to have been among the first to
offer their public condolences to the US ambassadorin the
days immediately after the September

II, 2001

attacks. They

later came out strongly in favor of the invasion of Iraq and
were beside themselveswith joy over news of the captureof
Saddam. In Goulmima, residentshave even joked that Bush
must be himself an Ait Murghad (the local Berbertribe), going as far as creatinga fictive genealogyto incorporatehim as
their symbolic brother.Indeed, their only reproachfor Bush
waswhy he had not alreadytakenthe battleto Saddam's"AraboBaathist"neighborsin Syria.
In like fashion, these peripheralAmazigh militants have
increasinglyrefused to voice active support for the Palestinian struggle, viewing the hegemonic pro-Palestinianpolitics
of the Moroccan left as a poignant exampleof imposed Arab
nationalism.This unwillingnessto criticizeIsraelistateactions
stems in part from a largerphilo-Semitic discourse adopted
by many Amazigh activists.While by no means the agents of
the Israelistate that Islamistsoccasionallyaccuse them of being, some Amazigh militantshave activelysought to reconcile
Jewishand Berberpopulations,and have publicly advocateda
normalizationof relationswith Israel.Theygenerallysee in the
Israelisa direct parallelfor the Amazigh struggle:a minority
people who succeeded in codifying and saving a threatened
47

47

PICKS
EDITOR'S
American Friends Service Committee. When
the Rain Returns: TowardJustice and Reconciliation in Palestineand Israel(Philadelphia:
American Friends Service Committee,
2004).

TheStruggleBetweenJews and Zionists in the
Aftermath of World War II (Monroe, ME:
Common Courage Press, 2004).
Human RightsWatch, Morocco:Human Rightsat
a Crossroads(New York, October 2004).

Cohen, Stephen P. TheIdea ofPakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,2004).

International Crisis Group, Iraq: Can Local
GovernanceSave Central Government?(AmCollins, John. Occupied by Memory: 7he Intiman/Brussels,October 2004).
fada Generationand the Palestinian State of
International Crisis Group, Who Governs the
Emergency(New York:New York University
WestBank?Palestinian Adminstration Under
Press, 2004).
Israeli Occupation (Amman/Brussels, September 2004).
Eppel, Michael. Iraqfrom Monarchyto Tyranny
(Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida,
Al-Khafaji, Isam. TormentedBirths: Passagesto
2004).
Modernity in Europe and the Middle East
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).
Grodzinsky,Yosef.In the Shadowof the Holocaust:

nate some of the main forms of official
linguistic and cultural discrimination
in the Moroccan legal and educational
systems. It serves as a visible symbol
of an emerging, state-sanctioned civil
society intended to please international
observers.While a number of Amazigh
activists have embraced the institute's
potentialto fostereducationin the native
tongue for ruralchildrenand to promote
Berberart and culture in urban public
spaces,otherscritiquethese overturesas
culturalcooptationby the statedesigned
ultimately to divide the transnational
Amazigh movement. One recalls that
the late King Hassan II was skilled at
manipulating ethnic politics, "playing
differentfactionsoff againstone another,
thereby gathering decisive power into
his own hands."4Perhaps, the Moroccan monarchy requiresdivisive ethnic
politics in orderto function.
But beyond its fragmentingeffectson
opposition politics, the establishmentof
IRCAM underlines how, increasingly,
cultural and linguistic expression has
been articulatedas a fundamentalhuman
right in Morocco and internationally.If,
on an internationallevel, the protection
of culturalrightshas been postulatedas
a precondition for entry into the ranks
of democracies,on a domesticlevelit has
been upheld as a means of fostering national unity.But, ironically,the IRCAM
dahir seems to fetishize Berbernessin a
way that is reminiscentof the protectorate-era"Berberdahir"that inflamedMoroccannationalistpassionin I930. While
The creationof IRCAMhas helpedelimi- the new dahir does not outline separate

language, gained territorial autonomy
and is currently threatened by a surroundingArab majority.
Such pro-Americanism and philoSemitism have brought many Amazigh
militants into direct conflict with the
very leftist groupsin which the majority
of them cut their political teeth in the
university student unions during the
1970s and I98os. Accusing the Moroccan left of latent Arab nationalism, a
numberofAmazigh associationsrefused
to participatein-and even activelyopposed-the various anti-warralliesand
May Day demonstrationsorganized in
the past severalyears.The disagreement
over the Palestinianquestion has even
occasionallybrokenout into violent confrontationsbetweenthe two movements.
In what the Amazigh press decried as
"pseudo-Marxist terrorism" (al-irhab
al-mutamarks),on December 23, 2003
members of the MarxistBasistestudent
movement brutallyknifed a handful of
Amazigh student union membersat the
Universityof Errachidiawhen the latter
refusedto participatein an examstrikein
solidaritywith the intifada.Althoughthe
details of the attack remain contestedwith some claimingthat the conflictwas
as raciallyas ideologicallymotivated-it
does point to the ways in which Moroccan oppositional politics have become
violently fragmentedin the years since
the establishmentof IRCAM.

Unintended
Consequences
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Islamic laws for urban people (understood to be Arabs)and customary,"tribal"
laws for ruralpeople (understoodto be
Berbers),it does pave the way for different educationalformatsin differentparts
of the kingdom. The areaswhere Berber
is to be the languageof instruction are
in largepartthe countrysideratherthan
the city, making ruraland urban education even more separate-and even less
equal.In protestingthese clearlydivisive
policies, Moroccan Amazigh militants
have turned to their transnational interlocutors, soliciting diaspora Berber
associations and international bodies
supporting autochthonous peoples'
rights. Rather than an imagined modernist national unity, the establishment
of IRCAM may serve to underwriteregional entrenchment and a form of opposition politics that seeksto bypassthe
nation-state,not strengthenit.m
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